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HIPAA assessment

For SlowBooks Pro v2.31.4 · Download this guide (one HTML file) · Source on GitHub

Status: SlowBooks Pro 2026 is not a HIPAA-covered system by default. It's accounting and payroll software, not a healthcare information system. This document is an honest accounting of where its controls already align with the HIPAA Security Rule and where the gaps are — so a business that needs HIPAA-style assurances can make an informed decision.

1. Does HIPAA apply to SlowBooks?

HIPAA applies to Covered Entities (healthcare providers, health plans, healthcare clearinghouses) and Business Associates that handle Protected Health Information (PHI) on their behalf. PHI is anything that identifies an individual and relates to their physical or mental health, healthcare provision, or payment for healthcare.

What SlowBooks stores that is potentially HIPAA-adjacent:

Data	HIPAA classification	Notes
Employee name + address	Not PHI by itself	Becomes PHI only when combined with healthcare information
Employee SSN (last 4 on the record; the full number on an uploaded W-4 or I-9)	Not PHI	An identifier, but no health data attached
Employee bank routing / account #	Not PHI	Financial data, encrypted at rest
Pay-stub gross / withholding	Not PHI	Wage data
HSA deduction amount	Not PHI	Reveals only that an HSA exists, not health details
Health insurance enrollment (a benefit code such as "Section 125 Health Premium", its rate, the carrier it is remitted to)	Borderline	The benefits engine stores the enrollment and the carrier as a vendor; no plan, claim or diagnosis details
Pre-tax FSA / dependent-care amount	Not PHI	Same
Actual claims, diagnoses, treatment	Would be PHI	We don't store any of this

Default verdict: A business running SlowBooks for normal accounting + payroll is not a HIPAA-regulated workflow. Customer becomes a Business Associate only if they explicitly use the app to handle PHI on behalf of a Covered Entity, which isn't the design intent.

2. HIPAA Security Rule mapping

For businesses that want HIPAA-aligned controls regardless of strict applicability, here's where each Security Rule technical safeguard maps to existing SlowBooks behavior.

§ 164.312(a)(1) — Access Control

Spec	Implementation
Unique user identification (R)	✅ Named users in four roles (administrator, bookkeeper, accountant, read-only), enforced centrally for every route; API tokens are their own principals (`token:<label>` in the audit log), never administrators (since 2.29.0; an older administrator token is refused since 2.31.2). Access is by route group, not per field
Emergency access procedure (R)	Manual — any administrator's sign-in, the recovery key of an encrypted company file, and the backup files
Automatic logoff (A)	✅ `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` (default 14400s / 4h) clears sessions
Encryption + decryption (A)	✅ Fernet for bank PII at rest; AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA256

§ 164.312(b) — Audit Controls

"Implement hardware, software, and/or procedural mechanisms that record and examine activity in information systems that contain or use ePHI."

Mechanism	Implementation
Login attempts	✅ `LoginAttempt` table — success / failure with IP + UA
Database row writes	✅ `register_audit_hooks(SessionLocal)` in `app/main.py` writes an `audit_log` row for every create / update / delete via SQLAlchemy event hooks
Document tampering	✅ `DocumentAudit` table + SHA-256 content hash printed in tax-form PDF footers
Portal token usage	✅ `Employee.portal_token_last_used` rolls forward on every authenticated portal request

§ 164.312(c)(1) — Integrity

"Implement policies and procedures to protect ePHI from improper alteration or destruction."

Spec	Implementation
Authentication of ePHI (A)	✅ Fernet ciphertext carries HMAC; tampered ciphertext fails to decrypt and returns None
Document integrity	✅ SHA-256 hash + audit ID printed in tax-form PDFs; auditor can re-verify by regenerating

§ 164.312(d) — Person or Entity Authentication

Spec	Implementation
Verify identity before access	✅ Argon2id password (default cost ~100ms/verify); 5/min rate-limited login
Session integrity	✅ Starlette signed cookie + session rotation on login
Portal authentication	✅ 192-bit `secrets.token_urlsafe(24)` token; 90-day idle + 1-year hard expiry

§ 164.312(e)(1) — Transmission Security

Spec	Implementation
Integrity controls (A)	✅ On a production server behind a TLS proxy (`docker-compose.prod.yml`): HSTS `max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload`. ⚠ The desktop app, Server Edition on a LAN and the single-host `docker compose up` serve plain HTTP by design (`APP_DEBUG=true` / `SLOWBOOKS_PRIVATE_NETWORK=1`), with no HSTS
Encryption (A)	✅ `FORCE_HTTPS=true` (default in production) + `HTTPSRedirectMiddleware`; session cookie carries `Secure` flag. ⚠ Not on the plain-HTTP deployments above: a HIPAA-conscious deployment is the production image behind HTTPS (Hosting on a cloud server)
Database transport	✅ Startup fails hard in production if `DATABASE_URL` lacks `sslmode=require` (skipped by `SLOWBOOKS_PRIVATE_NETWORK=1`, where the database is on the host's own Docker network)

§ 164.312(a)(2)(iv) — Encryption at Rest

Field	Status
Bank routing #	✅ Fernet-encrypted
Bank account #	✅ Fernet-encrypted; only last-4 plaintext
AI provider API keys	✅ Fernet-encrypted via `app/services/crypto.py`
Password hashes	✅ Argon2id (one-way)
Company file (SQLite)	✅ Optional whole-file SQLCipher encryption (#290), off by default; on a desktop the key is the practice's own (a recovery key shown once, unlocked by an administrator's sign-in), on a server the operator's secret; backups are ciphertext; PostgreSQL is the host's job
Employee SSN	⚠ Only the last 4 digits on the record; an uploaded W-4 or I-9 (stored inside the company file) carries the full number, protected only by whole-file encryption
Employee name / address	⚠ Plaintext in the database (not PHI in HIPAA terms); encrypted on disk when whole-file encryption is on
HSA / health-insurance deduction amounts	⚠ Plaintext in the database (not PHI in HIPAA terms); same

3. Administrative + Physical Safeguards

These are deployment-time controls, not code controls. SlowBooks can be configured to support them but doesn't enforce them on its own.

Safeguard	Notes
§ 164.308 Security Management Process	Customer responsibility — risk analysis, sanctions policy, etc.
§ 164.308 Workforce Security	Customer responsibility — background checks, termination procedures
§ 164.308 Information Access Management	Four roles with central enforcement, sign-in end dates, one-time passwords for new sign-ins, sessions ended on deactivation, role change or password reset; the access policy itself is the customer's
§ 164.308 Security Awareness and Training	Customer responsibility
§ 164.308 Security Incident Procedures	Customer responsibility; SlowBooks logs help with detection
§ 164.308 Contingency Plan	✅ Backups and restore from Settings → Backup / Restore: a `pg_dump` on PostgreSQL, a copy of the company file on the desktop and Server Edition (encrypted when the file is)
§ 164.308 Evaluation	Periodic re-assessment — customer responsibility
§ 164.308 Business Associate Contracts	Customer responsibility — if SlowBooks operator becomes a BA
§ 164.310 Facility Access Controls	Physical deploy environment (datacenter / office) — customer responsibility
§ 164.310 Workstation Use / Security	Customer responsibility
§ 164.310 Device and Media Controls	Customer responsibility

4. Gaps if you wanted to run SlowBooks in a HIPAA context

If a customer chose to store ePHI in SlowBooks (e.g. health-insurance enrollment details beyond the deduction amount), here's what would need to change to fully align with the Security Rule:

Gap	Severity	Fix
Access control is by route group, not per field	Medium	Four roles decide which screens and operations a person reaches; HIPAA's "minimum necessary" may want finer cuts (one person sees pay, another only time). Would require per-field access checks
Employee data not encrypted per field	Medium	Names, addresses, hire date, etc. are plaintext in the database; whole-file encryption (SQLCipher) covers them on disk, and a PostgreSQL server relies on the host's disk encryption. If treated as PHI, would need Fernet wrapping (same scheme as bank fields)
No data-retention enforcement	Medium	Pay stubs and employee records stay forever. HIPAA expects retention/destruction policies — would need a configurable retention period + automated purge
No breach-notification flow	Medium	If the audit log detects tampering or unauthorized access, there's no automated alerting. Would need email/webhook integration
No employee data-export endpoint	Low	Right-to-access — the portal lets an employee see their own data, but there's no "give me everything you have on me as a JSON export" feature
No Business Associate Agreement (BAA) template	Low	Documentation gap. Vendor would need to provide a signable BAA
No FIPS 140-2 attestation	Low	Python's `cryptography` library uses OpenSSL underneath; FIPS mode depends on the OpenSSL build the customer's OS ships. SlowBooks doesn't enforce a FIPS-validated build
Encryption-at-rest key escrow	Low	`PAYROLL_ENCRYPTION_SECRET` is operator-managed. HIPAA HSM / KMS integration would be a customer-driven enhancement

5. What we already do that exceeds typical small-business norms

These aren't strictly HIPAA-required but are good signals for any compliance regime (HIPAA, SOC 2, PCI-DSS):

Versioned ciphertext (v1: prefix) — supports zero-downtime key rotation
Login + document audit trails, every tax-form PDF with its own SHA-256 content hash
Idle session timeout + automatic logoff
Startup fail-hard checks on production misconfig (an encryption secret that is the dev default, empty or short; DB TLS; FORCE_HTTPS)
Whole-file encryption of a company file (SQLCipher) with a recovery key shown once and per-administrator unlocking
"Ask for the password each time SlowBooks Pro starts", revocable sessions, sign-in end dates and one-time passwords for new sign-ins
Rate-limited login + Argon2id password hashing (~100ms cost)
Content-Security-Policy + HSTS + strict CORS
Atomic secret file writes (mkstemp + os.replace)
CSV formula-injection protection in exports
No hardcoded secrets anywhere in the codebase
SSRF protection on AI provider URL configuration

6. Recommendations for HIPAA-conscious deployments

If a customer is running SlowBooks for a small healthcare-adjacent business (e.g. a physical therapy practice's accounting, where they want HIPAA-style care even though only payroll/financial data is in scope):

Set strong production env vars — see Security hardening deployment checklist
Run behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy with a valid cert (Let's Encrypt is fine)
Restrict database access — pg_hba.conf to only the app host, sslmode=verify-full with cert pinning
Configure encrypted backups — pg_dump output should be GPG-encrypted at rest if it leaves the server
Set up offsite backup encryption keys separately from the database — never co-locate the encryption secret with the data
Enable system audit logging at the OS level (auditd / journald) — captures process-level events SlowBooks doesn't see
Rotate PAYROLL_ENCRYPTION_SECRET annually — use the PAYROLL_ENCRYPTION_SECRET_PREV flow for zero-downtime rotation
Review the Audit Log page and the login_attempts table weekly — even a quick "show me failed logins in the last 7 days" run catches slow probes (login_attempts has no page of its own; query it in the database)

7. Honesty notes

This document was written by an engineer doing a code audit, not by a HIPAA compliance officer. If HIPAA is contractually required for your deployment, retain a qualified compliance professional to do a real risk assessment.
"Aligned with" HIPAA's technical safeguards is not the same as "HIPAA-certified." The OCR doesn't certify software products; certification, if any, applies to the deployed system as operated by the Covered Entity or Business Associate.
The dependency scan (pip-audit) runs in CI on every change; an open advisory with no upstream fix would be listed in the release notes.

Last updated: 2026-10-31, for v2.31.3.